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Abstract 
Australian property law has steadily evolved to facilitate the recognition of new or previously 
unrecognised property rights. As the scope of the law has widened, modern property rights 
have become increasingly complex. One of the most famous Australian cases, Mabo, resulted 
in the acknowledgment of a whole class of property rights that were not previously 
recognised – native title. Subsequently, the High Court in Yarmirr broadened our 
understanding of property rights to include within native title the notion of ‘sea country’. The 
evolution of property rights has had fundamental implications when addressing compensation 
for the impairment or acquisition of land (Indigenous or non-Indigenous) by government. 
Indeed as understanding of property rights advances, the ambit of compensation is catapulted 
into uncharted waters. This paper highlights the difficulty of containing property rights to a 
particular set of descriptors and the effect this has on compensation claims. Further, the 
current methodology for processing compensation claims exposes a disconnect between the 
public and the New South Wales (NSW) government. Finally, through an exploration of 
specific examples of compensation for private property rights, this paper concludes that there 
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INTRODUCTION 
Eric Cline (2017, p. xvi) in his book Three Stones Make a Wall: The Story of Archaeology 
observes: ‘Many people…cannot accept the fact that mere humans might have come up with 
great innovations such as the domestication of plants and animals or could have built great 
architectural masterpieces such as the pyramids or the Sphinx all on their own.’  
As an archaeologist, Cline informs us that the record reveals ‘mere humans’ have clearly 
been innovative in antiquity in agriculture, animal husbandry, and architecture and 
construction technology. Unsurprisingly, similar human innovation in modernity is also 
occurring but in quite different areas relevant to the current milieu, such as property rights. 
Indeed, Australian property law has revealed, with the belated recognition of native title (as a 
descriptor of Indigenous property rights) by the High Court in the 1992 decision Mabo v. 
Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, that the ambit of prospective compensation for the 
commutation of property rights by government has widened significantly.   
Further, the language of Australian property law struggles to deal with Indigenous property 
rights known as ‘sea country’, first recognised in 2001 by the High Court in Commonwealth v 
Yarmirr; Yarmirr v Northern Territory [2001] HCA 56; 208 CLR 1. The Indigenous claimant 
Mary Yarmirr of the Croker Island people of Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory 
explained her understanding of sea country as follows: 
…when I talk about sea country, I am not talking only about the waters of the sea. 
I am talking about the sea bed and the reefs, and the fish and animals in the sea, and our 
fishing and hunting grounds, and the air and clouds above the sea, and about our sacred sites 
and ancestral beings who created all the country. 
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Our ancestors are still there. Our country, both land and sea, belongs to us, and we belong to 
it. For we cannot survive without the land and the sea, for it breathes, controls and gives life 
(Morris, 2002, p. 18). 
Such difficulties in descriptors of property rights (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) are not 
unexpected given the increasing complexity of private property rights, and hence the 
compensation assessment of such human losses is being catapulted into often wholly 
unfamiliar theory and practice territory. Yet, linguistic obfuscation remains a significant 
barrier in attempts to unravel the particular complexity of specific property rights, with such 
endeavours often thwarted by connotation integral to those tenures easily recognised as 
property, and hence readily compensable. Whilst compensation for loss of native title is 
unsurprisingly infused with spiritual and cultural values, unanticipated or previously 
intentionally unrecognised losses have also emerged elsewhere providing a greater 
understanding of the losses incurred by holders of private property rights (Indigenous or non-
Indigenous) when involuntarily commuted by government. 
For example, the 2016 reassessment of how compensation claims in the Australian State of 
New South Wales (NSW) are to be processed and subsequently assessed arguably reveals an 
underlying flaw in the social narrative between the citizenry and the NSW government.1 This 
paper canvasses the need for a consensus as to what is good compensation, bad 
compensation, and just plain fair compensation, such consensus created as a lens through 
which trust between the citizenry and the government is viewed. 
However, before canvassing the above matters the following section of this paper describes 
the origins of private property rights in Australia. 
                                                 




THE ORIGIN OF AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Australia has sovereign control over more land (Instituto del Tercer Mundo and New 
Internationalist, 2007, p. 90) 2 and marine area (Resource Assessment Commission, Coastal 
Zone Inquiry, 1993, p. 8) 3 of the globe than any other country except for the USA, Russia, 
and Canada. Since European settlement in 1770 and up to the previously mentioned 1992 
Mabo decision, all rights in property except for minerals were held in the land property right 
known more commonly as real property. Since Mabo, the notion of what are property rights 
under anglo-Australian land law has exploded with the identification of a raft of hitherto 
unknown separate private property rights, including: water property rights, biota property 
rights, Indigenous property rights (native title), carbon credit property rights, saline property 
rights, transferable development property rights (TDRs), and electromagnetic spectrum. All 
of the above except for electromagnetic spectrum are subsets of what was prior to 1992 
known as land property rights created either by the common law, statute law, or through a 
mixture of both common law and statute law.  
The appropriateness and resilience of conventional land titling systems to deal with these 
newly emerging property rights have raised fundamental issues rooted in our developing 
understanding of real property. Ancient Australian property rights such as native title are 
probably incapable of being wholly accommodated within conventional property rights titling 
systems, and arguably have acted as a catalyst for much of emerging property theory. The 
Australian regime of property rights (excluding native title) has its deep roots in the Roman 
                                                 
2 The land area of Australia is 7,741,220 square kilometres. 
3 The Australian marine zone comprises 8,900,000 square kilometres. 
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invention of real property based on earlier Egyptian and Greek concepts that required a 
satisfactory answer to the question of territoriality through: 
…publicly delimiting land and registering it as an object controlled by mortal individuals and 
not by immortal families. No distinction was made with respect to benefits (‘fruits’), access to 
them and the soil itself. In the sequel, the continuous struggling and arbitration disappears, 
heritage and succession becomes transparent. Transactions on the model of a contract 
between private parties, facilitated by surveyors, notaries, etc., make land a commercial good 
(Oestereich, 2000, pp. 223-224). 
This is a poignant reminder that customs and laws of many societies have only undergone 
incremental change throughout history, notwithstanding the sometimes violent precursors of 
such change. Australian property rights law are one such complex amalgam, and according to 
the linguist Masson (2001, p. 8S), studies of its post-Roman roots in English custom and law 
reveal: ‘… a curious and most marvellous gift for mutability and metamorphosis, rooted in a 
rich, complex and strange multilayered, multicultural history.’ 
Inescapably, property rights were of pivotal concern to those involved in conquest and 
dispossession, and hence once acquired the value of real property crystallised in the hands of 
the conquerors, notably the Normans in England. Similar to other areas of Western Europe, 
the value of rights to real property was central to the maintenance of civilised Norman 
England. Indeed, the concept of economic value with its inherent polity implications is the 
underlying thrust in many property rights discourses especially in North America, and in that 
context Ely (1998, p. 10) observes: 
English common law provided the legal foundation for property ownership in the colonies. 
Common law was customary law, deriving its authority from long-established usage. Royal 




Conceptually, property rights and the concept of value necessarily emerged as the twin leit 
motifs of English common law, and its colonial American progeny.  Australian property law 
was also a legal sibling of this tradition.  
The concept of value, especially when given monetary expression, involves the allocation of 
worth to a particular property right, usually as an estimate of its capitalised future potentiality 
based on its current utility. The concept of ascribing monetary value to such rights in property 
has its roots, according to Anderson (1989, p. 420), in the: 
…perdurable inheritance of classical antiquity. The Roman Empire, its final historical form, 
was not only itself naturally incapable of a transition to capitalism. The very advance of the 
classical universe doomed it to a catastrophic regression, of an order for which there is no real 
other example in the annals of civilization. The far more primitive social world of early 
feudalism was the result of its collapse, internally prepared and externally completed. 
Marxist writers such as Anderson (1989, p. 424) see medieval Western Europe in a slow 
although inexorable transition to the ‘capitalist mode of production’, yet these phenomena 
appear to have been unique to Europe because: ‘…European feudalism also underwent an 
evolution that had no parallel elsewhere. The extreme rarity of the fief system as a type of … 
property…was never known in the great Islamic states, or under successive Chinese 
dynasties…’. 
Conditional private property rights were transformed to absolute private property rights, 
which Anderson (1989, p. 425) notes had a significant result: 
[t]he formula, however, contains a profound truth if applied in a somewhat different sense: 
the transformation of one form of private property – conditional – into another form of private 
property – absolute – within the landowning nobility was the indispensable preparation for the 




Importantly, private rights in property arose with the emergence of ‘absolutist public 
authority’ wherein according to Anderson (1989, p. 429): 
The increase in the political sway of the royal state was accompanied, not by a decrease in the 
economic security of noble landownership but by a corresponding increase in the general 
rights of private property. The age in which ‘Absolutist’ public authority was imposed was 
also simultaneously the age in which ‘absolute’ private property was progressively 
consolidated. 
By the eighteenth century, the property rights revolution emerging from medieval times had, 
according to Adam Smith (1978, p. 410), resulted in private property rights being regarded as 
a tenet of English society and enforceable at law: ‘Property and civil government very much 
depend on one another. The preservation of property and the inequality of possession first 
formed it, and the state of property must always vary with the form of government.’ 
With the emergence of private property rights came the need for concomitant valuation of the 
worth of such rights.  However, the activity of ascribing the worth of property rights can be 
traced back to at least biblical times where Ephron in selling his field to Abraham says: ‘My 
Lord, hearken unto me: the land is worth four hundred shekels of silver; what is that betwixt 
me and thee?’ (Genesis 23:15, King James Version). 
The emergence between the 16th and the 18th centuries of the early modern market for private 
property rights was a response to the arrival of absolute private property. These property 
rights were not necessarily ill defined and, as Lie (1993, pp. 277) points out in his important 
work on the social origins of English market society in the period between 1550 and 1750, 
the commodification of many previously communal natural resources required the ascribing 




In addition, Lie (1993, pp. 280) points out that: ‘[t]he variety of commodities also expanded 
to include mechanical contrivances and luxury goods for the populace, leading…[writers] to 
characterize the period as “the birth of a consumer society”.’  
Importantly, the ‘market society’ entrusted with the smooth conduct of the open market in the 
various villages and towns included not only services such as toll-gatherers, cleaners and 
others, but importantly: ‘…appraisers were appointed to settle the value of goods in event of 
dispute’ (Lie, 1993, p. 282) 
In a similar vein to Lie, Moore (1964, p. 17) in his classic 1945 description of traditional 
English village life of fictitious ‘Elmbury’ described the real property beyond the medieval 
village which were held as communal rights, as: 
…something of a legal curiosity, and mixed up in its title-deeds were some of the principles 
of feudalism, capitalism, distributism, and communism. The hay crop belonged to a number 
of private owners, including the squire and the Abbey; their boundaries were marked 
mysteriously by means of little posts… 
But while the hay crop was private property, the meadow itself, the soil that grew the hay, 
belonged to “the burgesses”…[who] possessed no cows or sheep to graze upon it, so they too 
each season sold the aftermath by auction and distributed the proceeds, according to an 
ancient law…Nobody got more than a few shillings for his share; but at least every man, 
woman and child… had the right to walk and play in the field, which gave them a good 
possessive feeling about it. 
Spirituality pervaded medieval society, and it is not surprising that feudal property rights 
encompassed holistic notions such as conservation strategies, and village communism. Some 
of these rights described as profits-a-prendre (Hyam, 2014, p. 39) did not involve ownership 
of land and yet were viewed as valuable property rights. Such rights could be exclusive, or 
enjoyed in common with others, granted in perpetuity or for a fixed term. Moore (1964, p. 




[f]rom the banks of the river jutted out numberless fishing-rods; little boys with willow wands 
conjured up minnows… [fisherman] perched sedately on wicker creels ledgering for bream, 
while the more energetic ones, swift of eye and wrist, fished for roach, and the more 
adventurous wandered here and there, carrying a jar of minnows, live-baiting for perch….and 
the very old, and the very stupid, content with the mere dregs of angling, heaved enormous 
lobworms impaled upon enormous hooks into the deepest and stillest backwaters and then 
went to sleep until Fate, in the guise of a shiny yellow eel, accepted… 
Clearly many of these rights may be problematic as profits-a-prendre, however it does show 
the enormous breadth of communal and private property rights that until very recently existed 
in non-urban England.   
Paradoxically, the previously mentioned 1992 Mabo decision reconfirmed the feudal 
genealogy (Rogers, 1995, p. 184) of Australian private property rights, and hence the nuances 
of many of these feudal activity-based property rights of England demand our renewed 
attention. Adding to this genealogical feudality, some ‘new’ property rights such as biota, 
native title and water also require the convergence of property law and spatial science 
(‘territoriality’) (Sheehan and Small, 2005, p. 161; see also Sheehan and Small, 2002) with 
other disciplines such as botany, zoology, anthropology, archaeology and hydrology, and 
even more distant cross disciplinary activities such as ethnobotany and others.  
Further, the statutory creation of separate water property rights in various Australian states 
such as NSW (Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)) severed the traditional common law 
nexus between land and water. This legislative action starkly highlighted the need for 
appropriate and robust regimes of property rights that use conventional land titling 
approaches melded with an urgent understanding of the nature and content of the particular 
natural resource, water. The conceiving of such ‘new’ property rights requires attention to the 
twin issues of definitional territoriality or ‘exclusivity’ (Scott, 1999, p. 19), and value 
ascription, if these emerging freestanding rights are to have economic worth coupled with 
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‘third-party adjudication and enforcement’ (Barzel, 1997, p. 4) as legal rights. However, 
familiar and emerging private property rights are all held in Australia at the pleasure of the 
Crown, which has the ability to compulsorily acquire those private rights subject to some 
safeguards (and even guarantees in some jurisdictional circumstances). The protection 
offered to holders of those private rights will be discussed in the following section of this 
paper. 
 
PROTECTING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In common law countries such as England, the US and Australia, the capacity of government 
to commute private property rights is contingent wherein ‘the compensation principle was 
partially recognized by Magna Carta’ of 1215 (Ely, 1998, p. 23) and Roman Law inputs to 
the English common law in the 1230’s (Stein, 1999, p. 64). Magna Carta was kept alive 
throughout the 1300’s by lawyers, aided by a 1368 statute of Edward III declaring ‘if there be 
any Statute made to the contrary, [Magna Carta] shall be holden for none’ (Harley, 2015, p. 
6). Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 1600’s utilised Magna Carta to challenge the 
Divine Right of Kings (Harris, 2015, p. 66) and to foster new American colonies (Charter of 
1606), the outcomes of which were inspiration for more modern protections such as the Fifth 
Amendment of the US Constitution (Gardner, 1997, p. 542), the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, and ultimately s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution.  
However, common law countries like Australia are also impacted by international law, such 
as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 1948 at Article 17, which states that ‘No 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’. More recently, in 2008 the UNFAO 
published a guide to ‘good practice’ entitled Compulsory Acquisition of Land and 
Compensation, which establishes various criteria pertaining to compulsory acquisition 
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processes and compensation. The Australian Law Reform Commission (2015, p. 487) has 
noted international instruments such as those mentioned above are not part of domestic law 
until recognised in statutes: ‘…where a statute is ambiguous, courts will generally favour a 
construction that accords with Australia’s international obligations…’ 
Irrespective, the acquisition of private property rights presents a challenge to most holders 
who are ‘completely unfamiliar’ with legislation and other processes involved in compulsory 
acquisition and significantly at a disadvantage to the ‘highly resourced, extensively 
experienced’ acquiring authority or third party (Shannon, 2012, p. 9). Similarly the Fifth 
Amendment of the American Constitution was drafted as ‘the primary means of protecting 
private property from the excesses of government’ (Gardner, 1997, p. 545), and in Australia 
there is the re-occurring theme of protecting private property from such excesses through a 
guarantee of just terms compensation in the Australian Constitution (Irving, 1997, p. 96; see 
also De Soyza, 2017a, p. 451). 
However, in NSW the Federal constitutional guarantee of just terms compensation does not 
apply to state acquisitions of private property, although in 2009 in R&R Fazzolari Pty 
Limited v Parramatta City Council; Mac's Pty Limited v Parramatta City Council [2009] 237 
CLR 603 at paragraph 5 the High Court observed: ‘…in accordance with established 
principles of statutory interpretation the preferable construction is that which authorizes the 
least interference with private property rights.’ 
In Fazzolari, Parramatta City Council intended to acquire private land that would 
subsequently be sold and redeveloped to form part of land to be called the ‘Civic Place’. To 
compulsorily acquire the private land, Council issued Proposed Acquisition Notices (PANs) 
to various private landowners within the proposed ‘Civic Place’, one being Fazzolari. The 
intention was that once the private lands were acquired, a $AUD1.6 billion redevelopment 
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would be undertaken by means of a Public Private Partnership between Parramatta City 
Council and a developer GROCON. The development proposal required Council to transfer 
some of the acquired land to GROCON in return for significant financial payments. In the 
Land and Environment Court, Fazzolari argued that this would constitute a ‘resale’ for the 
purposes of s 188(1) of the Local Government Act 1993, an action unlawful. The Court found 
in favour of Fazzolari and held the compulsory acquisitions were unlawful. Council 
subsequently appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal where the decision was reversed. Finally, 
Fazzolari was granted special leave to appeal in the High Court and the original decision of 
the Land and Environment Court was reinstated. 
It was held that the power of local government (such as Parramatta City Council) to 
compulsorily acquire private land lies in s 186 Local Government Act 1993, but constrained 
by s 188: 
(1) A Council may not acquire land under this part by compulsory process without the 
approval of the owner of the land if it is being acquired for the purpose of re-sale. 
(2) However, the owner’s approval is not required if: 
a) The land forms part of, or adjoins or lies in the vicinity of, other land acquired at 
the same time under this Part for a purpose other than the purpose of re-sale.  
The first issue was whether the acquisition and then transfer to GROCON would be a ‘re-
sale’ within the meaning in s 188(1). The High Court held that the acquired land was to be 
transferred in exchange for money and other consideration, rendering it a ‘re-sale’. Further, it 
was enough to attract the constraint in s 188(1) that one of the purposes of the proposed 
acquisition was for re-sale, even if it could be argued that the dominant purpose was for 
redevelopment.  
The second issue was whether the surrounding streets, Darcy and Church, being acquired at 
the same time meant that Council could also acquire Fazzolari’s land under s 188(2)(a). 
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Parramatta Council delayed the acquisition of the streets so that it would coincide with the 
acquisition of Fazzolari’s land, in order to rely on s 188(2)(a) in case the ‘re-sale’ argument 
was not allowed. However, the High Court found that in this instance the Council’s ability to 
acquire its own roads (Darcy and Church Streets) was not found in the Local Government Act 
1993, but rather relied on s 7B of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991: 
An authority of the State that is authorized by law to acquire land by compulsory process in 
accordance with this Act may so acquire the land even if the land is vested in the authority 
itself.  
The fact Council was acquiring land for the purpose of transfer for money and other 
consideration to permit development for a profit invalidated the compulsory acquisition. If 
the acquisition had been for a public purpose such as a park or library, Fazzolari would not 
have been able to prevent the acquisition. The High Court was unwilling to interpret statutory 
regulations in a manner that might unduly infringe on private property rights, and accorded 
with longstanding common law presumptions that Parliament’s intention is not to interfere 
with fundamental rights unless the precise wording of the statute says so (Coco v the Queen 
(1994) 179 CLR  427 at [10]). 
Early commentary on the presumption from William Blackstone in Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1765) (p. 135) articulates that the common law would not allow for the 
‘least violation’ of private property. In 1904, Griffith CJ (as he was then) expressed in 
Clissold v Perry (1904 1 CLR 363) that the construction of statutes is not to be interpreted to 
interfere with vested interests, unless the intention is obvious. Most recently in Fazzolari 
(2009, paragraph 43), French CJ stated that: 
 …[a]s a practical matter… where a statute is capable of more than one construction, that 
construction will be chosen which interferes least with private property rights… 
Constructional choices are open, so that they do not encroach upon fundamental rights and 
freedoms at common law. 
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In spite of such deeply rooted common law principles, and the result in Fazzolari, 
subsequently in 2009 the NSW Parliament amended s 7 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms 
Compensation) Act 1991 to permit compulsory acquisition of land by Councils for re-sale in s 
188(2).  
Justice Kirby explained in Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v the State of NSW [2001] 205 CLR 399 
(Durham) that an extreme departure from fundamental rights may be challenged on a 
constitutional basis. His Honour opined that the role of the Constitution for judicial 
protection in the face of legislation is ‘substantial’ (Durham, 2001, paragraph 72). Hence, that 
the 2009 amendment of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 
constitutes an extreme derogation from fundamental rights remains an open question. The 
potential exploitation of this legal loophole by Councils would undeniably fall outside the 
ambit of good or fair compensation.  
Yet, soberly it is recalled that the High Court in New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 
20 CLR 54 (known as the Wheat Case) confirmed State Parliaments retain ‘sovereignty to 
make laws for the compulsory acquisition for private property without payment of 
compensation’ (Raff, 2002, p. 40) should a State so decide. Indeed, there is a history of 
reduced compensation for specific projects such as the Eastern Suburbs Railway in Sydney 
where compensation was limited to 27 February 1967 irrespective of the settlement of the 
compensation claim many years later. 
Notwithstanding, recent changes to procedures for compensation claimed by private land 
owners suggests the increasing complexity of property rights in NSW (and the expectations 
of the citizenry) is slowly forcing changes to current legislated restrictive practices (Sheehan, 
2010, p. 109). It is these emerging changes that are canvassed in the following section of this 




CHANGING COMPENSATION FOR IMPACTED PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Arnold posits in The Reconstitution of Property (2002, p. 296), that property as being a 
‘bundle of rights … fails to consider a variety of factors that shape both human relationships 
with respect to objects and the content and scope of property arrangements.’ He proposes as a 
more appropriate metaphor for the notion of property the descriptor a ‘web of interests’ 
(Arnold, 2002, p. 331). Just as Mary Yarmirr’s explanation of sea country involves a series of 
relationships between the reefs, fish, animals, the fishing and hunting grounds, the air, clouds, 
and sacred sites and ancestral beings, the metaphorical ‘web of interests’ contemplates the 
various types of interconnections that exist in both ‘person-object relationships [and] person-
person relationships’ (Arnold, 2002, p. 331). Arguably, an early extension of the web was the 
recognition of spiritual and cultural values imbedded in specific native title rights in Mabo. 
As more emerging property rights (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) are recognised, the 
outliers of the web increase. However, more recently the expansion of property rights has 
catapulted the notion of compensation into unfamiliar territory, demonstrating that the web is 
ever more complex. Three diverse examples of this unfamiliar territory are provided: firstly 
the use of solatium to assess spiritual and cultural compensation, secondly compensation for 
the impact of the Sydney Third Runway, and thirdly, compensation for biodiversity loss. 
1. Solatium to assess spiritual and cultural compensation (Griffiths v Northern 
Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900 (Griffiths)  
The 2016 decision in Griffiths is a recent example of the expansion of the notion of 
compensation for property rights, and has provided an emerging methodology for assessing 
the loss of spiritual and cultural interests through the existing tool of solatium. Before 
Griffiths, there had been only one successful determination of compensation for the 
16 
 
extinguishment of omnibus native title rights and interests, namely the decision in De Rose v 
State of South Australia [2013] FCA 988. Unfortunately, the methodology for assessing 
solatium and the amount assessed in this decision was confidential.   
In Griffiths, it was noted the Ngaliwurru and Nungali People held non-exclusive native title 
over land in Timber Creek, a township in the Northern Territory. Subsequently, the Court 
noted that exclusive native title had been recognised in some town lots (Griffiths v Northern 
Territory of Australia, [2007] 165 FCR 391). Action by the Northern Territory extinguished 
(wholly or partially) impaired or suspended native title, which led to a claim for 
compensation under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). In Griffith, Mansfield J held that 
compensation was payable, and an amount was determined to be approximately $3.3 million 
for economic loss, non-economic loss and (simple) interest.  
Unhelpfully, the NTA provides limited guidance for assessing native title compensation s 51 
blandly stating that native title holders are entitled to compensation:  
…on just terms to compensate the native title holders for any loss, diminution, impairment or 
other effect of the act on their native title rights and interests (Native Title Act 1993 Cth, s 
51).  
The existing principles of the Northern Territory’s compulsory acquisition laws when 
determining compensation were considered in Griffiths, when coupled with ‘intuition and the 
exercise of judicial discretion’ (Flynn, 2017, p. 72) provided the vague framework within 
which Mansfield J was able to determine the appropriate amount of compensation. 
Part of the $3.3 million compensation comprised $1.3 million for non-economic loss or 
solatium. Ordinarily, solatium is compensation awarded to non-Indigenous holders of 
property rights for injured or hurt feelings (Carson v John Fairfax and Sons Limited and Slee, 
1993 178 CLR 44). In Griffiths, this was a particularly difficult task, because provisions of 
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land compensation statutes in assessing compensation for the loss of native title rights and 
interests are intended to value the land as a ‘material object traded in a market for a like or 
analogous commodity.’ (Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths 2017 FCAFC 106, p. 
144) To arrive at this solatium assessment of $1.3 million, Mansfield J reviewed evidence 
about the Claim Group’s relationship with the affected land, including testimony from elders 
and anthropology experts about the significance of certain sites. Further evidence that 
suggested an interference with Dreaming was also of particular interest to the Court.  
Despite an appeal from the Commonwealth on almost every aspect of the 2016 decision of 
Mansfield J, the Full Federal Court subsequently agreed with His Honour on most findings, 
importantly including the solatium component (Griffiths, 2017) though the findings were not 
without subsequent external criticism (De Soyza, 2017b). The Full Federal Court observed 
(Griffiths, 2017, p. 393): 
The unusual challenge presented by this case … is that … there is no history in Australia of 
analogous awards of compensation for non-economic loss from the extinguishment of native 
title rights and interests. 
Further, applying provisions of land compensation statutes to loss of native title rights and 
interests were considered futile as ‘Aboriginal rights and interests in land have dimensions 
remote from the notions enshrined in Australian land law’ (Griffiths, 2017, p. 144).   
Mansfield J. had also given weight to whether the Australian public would view the outcome 
as fair to the Claim Group (Griffiths, 2017, pp. 395-396). The Full Federal Court concurred, 
finding that an award of $1,000 ‘would not satisfy the moral sense of the community’, 
whereas $1.3 million is a ‘substantial acknowledgement of a high level of damage done to the 
Claim Group.’ (Griffiths, 2017, p. 396) There was no substantial guidance from past cases of 
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damage to Indigenous cultural rights in the present circumstances, or from agreed 
compensation amounts in other commercial agreements made by the Claim Group.  
The Indigenous owners’ unique bond with Australian land, which is vastly different to the 
relationship between non-Indigenous and their land, had forced both Mansfield J and the Full 
Federal Court to appreciate the effects of the compensable acts ‘in terms of the pervasiveness 
of Dreaming.’ (Griffiths, 2017, p. 315) The effects of the compensable acts could therefore 
only be analysed in globo, as opposed to a parcel-by-parcel basis. The connection the 
Indigenous owners have with the land was not geographically divisible, meaning acts in one 
place could affect other places. Further, while no area is insignificant, there are other areas 
that have a special power and importance (Griffiths, 2017, p. 317). It was therefore 
impossible to establish the impact of the compensable acts within the boundaries of each 
distinct lot, requiring crucially Mansfield J to make a judgment about the effect over many 
lots generally.  
It was suggested nevertheless by the Full Federal Court that dividing the compensation 
claims into economic and non-economic loss may create difficulties in future compensation 
claims (Griffiths, 2017, p. 144). The now well recognised spiritual connection Indigenous 
peoples have with their land was documented in 1971 by Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco 
Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 stating at 167: 
 …the spirit ancestors, the people of the clan, particular land, and everything that exists on 
and in it, are organic parts of one indissoluble whole. 
Yet, perversely the High Court subsequently observed the NTA requires the ‘spiritual or 
religious [be] translated into the legal.’ (Western Australia v Ward 2002 213 CLR 1WA v 
Ward, 2002, p. 14) The task of assessing compensation for the loss of native title rights and 
interests is imbued with difficulties, partly due to native title as a recently recognised 
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property rights species, and also due to minimal precedential guidance. However, there are 
over 300 native title groups within Australia pressing compensation claims, (Flynn, 2017, p. 
73) highlighting the significance of Griffiths. 
2. Compensation for the impact of the Sydney Third Runway. 
A second example of the expansion of compensable property rights is the Sydney Airport 
Noise Amelioration Program (SANAP). To cope with increasing air traffic at Sydney 
Kingsford Smith Airport, a decision was made in 1994 to construct a new runway that ran 
parallel to the existing north-south runway. Between 1987 and 1998, the Federal Airports 
Corporation (FAC) was the body responsible for the operation of Federal airports in 
Australia. The FAC could establish new airports, and vary existing airports pursuant to ss 25 
and 26 Federal Airports Corporation Act 1986 (Cth) enabling the FAC to construct the Third 
Runway. Further, the (then) Minister for Transport announced that innovative measures 
would be taken to ameliorate the impact of cumulative aircraft noise in the area surrounding 
the enlarged airport. Accordingly, in 1994 SANAP commenced to reduce anticipated noise 
levels to Australian Standard 2021  (Acoustics Aircraft Noise Intrusion Building Siting and 
Construction) tables on Indoor Design Sound Levels (AS2021) (Department of Transport and 
Regional Development, 1997, p. 16). The constitutive elements of SANAP included 
voluntary acquisitions of all residences, churches and child-care centres in the Australian 
Noise Exposure Forecast (ANEF) 40 contour zone, the insulation of public buildings (such as 
schools, child-care centres, hospitals and healthcare facilities) within the ANEF 25 contour 
zone and the insulation of residential properties within the ANEF 30 contour zone 
(Department of Transport and Regional Development, 1997, p. 16). 
Narang and Butler observed in 1996 various insulation and noise attenuation methods were 
successfully trialed, with resultant options for insulation treatment for residential owners to 
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elect without affecting the livability or acoustics of the property (Burgess, Cotton and Butler, 
2000). One of the many features of this package of options was that a ‘scoper’ (Department 
of Transport and Regional Development, 1997, p. 30) would assess each house to determine 
the appropriate type of treatment and the extent of the treatment from the menu of approved 
treatments, where the menu would allow for ‘more extensive treatments for the houses with 
higher aircraft noise level.’ (Burgess, 1997, p. 4) Types of treatment were mostly confined to 
external insulation such as replacing and sealing external doors, blocking vents and openings 
of external walls, replacing and double-glazing windows and insulating roofing. This was 
because internal noise attenuation was considered (mostly) unacceptable to residential owners 
(Burgess, Cotton and Butler, 2000, p. 2). After consideration of homeowner preferences the 
scoper would prepare a Scope of Works, present the quotes for the work and the lowest 
(workable) quoter would undertake the work. The maximum amount of money for treatments 
per residence was $45,000 initially, although this increased to between $47,000 and $50,000 
to reflect CPI movements (Department of Transport and Regional Development, 1997, p. 30; 
Burgess, Cotton and Butler, 2000, p. 2). 
In total, 147 of the 161 eligible residential owners accepted the offer for voluntary 
acquisition. The acquired lands were transferred to the local council and converted into park 
(Sydney Airport, n.d.). The 99 public buildings within the ANEP 25 contour zone were 
insulated to meet the internal design noise levels recommended by AS2021. Due to the 
architectural, functional and heritage differences of each property, an acoustic consultant was 
engaged to investigate and recommend a cost-effective solution for noise reduction (Burgess, 
Cotton and Butler, 2000, p. 1). Ultimately 4,083 of the properties that were eligible for the 
insulation program were insulated for noise impact (Sydney Airport, n.d.). 
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Initially, there were concerns that the suburb of Sydenham was being ‘sacrificed because it’s 
not a rich suburb’ (McDonald, 1993). However, fears of the Sydenham citizenry of being 
unfairly affected by the impact of the Third Runway were not subsequently realised, with 
88% of residential owners giving positive feedback about SANAP (Burgess, Cotton and 
Butler, 2000, p. 4). Obviously, dwellings built of denser material such as brick were more 
effectively insulated, while timber dwellings revealed only modest noise attenuation and 
hence, SANAP provided further funding of up to $15,000 for such less weighty construction 
(Burgess, Cotton and Butler, 2000, p. 4). 
Generally, SANAP was a successful (albeit expensive) Federal government undertaking that 
improved noise reduction for those areas affected by the new Third Runway. SANAP was the 
first such program in Australia, and demonstrated an innovative approach to compensation 
for impairment of property rights (NSW Government, Transport for NSW, 2017). 
Interestingly, in 1993 impact of the Third Runway was anticipated to bring about a 
significant increase in air traffic of about 111% (McDonald, 1993), which was obviously a 
significant underestimation as air movements have continued to grow.  
3. Compensation for biodiversity loss (the OEH model) 
A third and final example of the expansion of compensable property rights can be found in 
the recent Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Amendment Act 2016 (NSW) (the 
Amendment). The legislative change arguably has its roots partly in the 2006 NSW Court of 
Appeal decision Leichardt Council v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2006] NSWCA 
353 (Leichhardt) and the subsequent 2008 decision of the Land and Environment Court of 
NSW in Sutherland Shire Council v Sydney Water Corporation [2008] NSWLEC 303 
(Sutherland). Both cases rejected the arguments by State agencies that a nominal value for 
Council land was appropriate compensation because a market value could not be readily 
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ascertained. In the leading Leichhardt decision, the compensation for the parkland 
compulsorily acquired from Council was essentially market value being a replacement value, 
being the value of adjacent residential land. These two cases arguably instigated the resultant 
drafting of s 56(3) of the 2016 Amendment, which states that where land is used for a 
particular purpose, and a general market for that land use does not exist, alternative market 
values are to be determined on the basis that the owner will be reinstated in another, 
equivalent, location.  
Importantly, s 56(3) of the Amendment also supports the wider notion of negative 
environmental externalities such that compensation ought to ascertained for additional 
specific value losses detected such as biodiversity. In 1993, Berat proposed judicial liability 
in international law should exist for negative environmental acts which ‘kill the earth’ (Berat, 
1993, p. 327) and the authors suggest this notion now exists, albeit in a very limited way, 
through the creation of s 56(3) of the Amendment. In much the same frame as the decisions in 
Leichhardt and Sutherland and the subsequent s 56(3), the NSW Office of Environment and 
Heritage (OEH) offset scheme has been applied in various circumstances throughout the State 
to attribute compensation for biodiversity losses additional to the familiar heads of 
compensation at s 55(a-f) Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW).  
One example of the application of the OEH scheme can be found in the response to the 
‘Ellerton Drive Extension’ (Bypass) comprising a $86 million, 4.6km long road providing an 
alternative route around the CBD of the regional city of Queanbeyan. The Bypass necessarily 
caters for forecast population growth and resultant traffic increases, however the construction 
of the Bypass involved considerable clearing of native vegetation. Queanbeyan City Council 
(QCC) required approval pursuant to Part 5 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Act 1979 (NSW) to construct the Bypass, involving a review of environmental factors (REF) 
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and a species impact statement (SIS). There was local concern the Bypass would negatively 
affect the environment (Jetty Research, 2015, p. 4), however construction of the Bypass 
commenced on 20th November 2017 and completion is anticipated by mid 2020 (NSW 
Government, Transport, 2017). 
The route of the Bypass encompassed native vegetation listed under the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) and the Environmental Protection Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (Cth) (NGH Environmental, 2016, p. 33), and thus required a biodiversity 
compensation strategy (NGH Environmental, 2014, p. 92). Endangered native vegetation 
does not traditionally carry any economic value, meaning that negative environmental 
externalities such as loss of biodiversity are rarely considered. However, by 2017 the OEH 
has developed a set of principles utilising offsets as a means to counteract the negative 
environmental impact of certain developments. An offset scheme that conforms to the OEH 
offset principles requires that in any acquisition of land, any vulnerable or endangered species 
and/or habitat must be re-established elsewhere and result in a net improvement in 
biodiversity over time (NSW Government, Office of Environment and Heritage, 2017). The 
condition for choosing a particular relocation area requires the identification of similar 
ecological quality and characteristics of the destroyed land. Further, the relocation area must 
be of similar habitat quality to allow for adequate flora and fauna preservation, and conform 
to the standard methodologies published by the OEH and the Commonwealth Department of 
Environment (DoE) (Queanbeyan City Council, 2016, p. 48). Such methodologies are 
conceived to ensure biodiversity loss that occurs from the acquisition and destruction of the 
acquired land is compensated in an offset elsewhere.  
QCC in consultation with OEH developed an offset program to ‘compensate for the loss of 
[biodiversity]’ (Department of the Environment and Energy, 2016, p. 2) as well as for the 
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cost of acquiring the land (NGH Environmental, 2014, p. 92). The offset program stipulated 
that no less than 50.0 hectares of White Box Yellow Box Blakely's Red Gum Grassy 
Woodland and Derived Native Grassland ecological community; and 7,877 Hoary Sunray 
plants be offset in an area roughly 4.5km southwest of Queanbeyan (Department of the 
Environment and Energy, 2016). Therefore, the compensation paid by QCC included both the 
acquisition by Council of replacement native vegetation lands together with a management 




Soberly, it is noted Australia (including NSW) falls within a group of countries including 
Canada, France and Greece that provide only ‘narrow compensation rights even for direct 
partial injuries’ and ‘there are no compensation rights at all for indirect injuries.’ (Alterman, 
2010, p. 63) Given the guarantee of just terms compensation in the Australian Constitution 
and the view in Fazzolari of French CJ that even within NSW, government should interfere 
‘least with private property rights’ (Fazzolari, 2009, paragraph 43), the restrictive nature of 
compensation rights is surprising. The difficulty of containing private property rights to a 
particular set of descriptors given the increasing complexity of existing and emerging 
property rights has resulted in innovative approaches to compensation, arguably to create a 
consensus between the citizenry and the government. 
The need for a consensus as to what is good compensation, bad compensation, and just plain 
fair compensation lies behind these innovative approaches to compensation. Clearly, for 
government to compulsorily impair or acquire private property rights without a full suite of 
compensation is unsustainable in a democratic country such as Australia, notwithstanding the 
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constraints of compensational legislation in the state of NSW. How then, have these 
innovative approaches to compensation been achieved in such an adverse legal environment?  
More progressive approaches to compensation have emerged through the use of specific 
purpose legislation such as the Federal Airports Corporation Act 1986 (Cth) for 
compensation accruing to nearby properties affected by the construction of the Third 
Runway, but crucially not acquired for that construction. A further more recent example is 
the NSW OEH biodiversity offset scheme, which effectively places a monetary value on the 
loss of biodiversity (NSW Government, Office of Environment and Heritage, 2017) in 
addition to the cost of acquiring the land (NGH Environmental, 2014). The OEH scheme 
imposes such obligations on infrastructure proponents such as QCC through the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). None of the above innovative 
approaches to compensation have their source in obligations contained within the Land 
Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991(NSW), and indeed the result is that such 
approaches break free of the restrictive compensation regime in the 1991 legislation.   
Finally, the decision in Griffiths provides another example, albeit through case law, of rights 
to compensation for previously unrecognised Indigenous rights and interests, which have not 
previously been dealt with in Australian compensation law and practice. The recognition of 
native title in Mabo presented the common law with an opportunity to re-examine how 
compensation is assessed when private property rights are impaired or extinguished, notably 
Indigenous property rights. The reconceiving of solatium to assess compensation for those 
elements of native title described as spiritual and cultural attachment is frankly recognition by 
the full Federal Court that compensation must be on just terms. 
Hence, both case law and innovative use of legislation has fundamental implications for the 
assessment of compensation and has catapulted the ambit of compensation into uncharted 
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waters, arguably to create a lens through which trust between the citizenry and the 
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